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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a generalized version of impulse balance equilibrium.
The stationary concept is applied to 3 ⇥ 3 games based on the Bailiﬀ and Poacher
Game (Selten, 1991) and its predictive success is experimentally tested against the
one of Nash equilibrium. Experiments with 26 diﬀerent games were conducted; 12
games with completely mixed Nash equilibria and 14 games with partially mixed Nash
equilibria. In all games, generalized impulse balance yields predictions that are closer
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1 Introduction
The predominance of behavioral concepts in terms of descriptive success over Nash equilibrium
is a well documented fact. Regularly, behavioral concepts describe the data gathered in
laboratory experiments much better than the Nash equilibrium does. Such behavioral
concepts are, for example, new stationary concepts (e.g., McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995, 1998;
Selten & Chmura, 2008; Goerg & Selten, 2009), models of level-k thinking (e.g., Nagel, 1995;
Ho, Camerer, & Weigelt, 1998; Crawford & Costa-Gomes, 2006), and models describing
learning processes (e.g., Erev & Roth, 1995, 1998; Ho, Camerer & Chong, 2007; Chmura,
Goerg & Selten, 2012).1
One stationary alternative that performed significantly better in previous studies than Nash
equilibrium is impulse balance equilibrium (Selten & Chmura, 2008). It is a non-parametric
concept based on the idea of learning direction theory (Selten & Buchta 1999). Probabilities
of decisions are modeled as behavioral tendencies and adjusted similar to the adjustments of
a marksman aiming at a trunk: “If he misses the trunk to the right, he will shift the position
of the bow to the left and if he misses the trunk to the left he will shift the position of the
bow to the right. The marksman looks at his experience from the last trial and adjusts his
behavior [. . . ].” (p. 86, Selten & Buchta, 1999). If there is no need for further adjustments
a stationary state is reached.
In previous studies impulse balance was first applied to auctions (Selten, Abbink, & Cox,
2005; Ockenfels & Selten, 2005) and later on to 2 ⇥ 2 games (Avrahami, Güth, & Kareev,
2005; Selten & Chmura, 2008), 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 games (Avrahami, Güth, & Kareev, 2005), as
well as, cyclic games (Goerg & Selten, 2009). In addition to out-perfoming Nash, impulse
balance equilibrium, performed at least as good as quantal response equilibrium in 2 ⇥ 2
games. Although, quantal response equilibrium is a parametric concept and impulse balance
1In Ho, Camerer & Chong (2007) self-tuning experience-weighted attraction learning competes against
quantal response equilibrium, which is a harder competitor than Nash.
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equilibrium is not (Selten & Chmura, 2008; Brunner, Camerer & Goeree, 2011; and Selten,
Chmura & Goerg, 2011).
Up to now impulse balance equilibrium was only applied to games in which players had two
decision alternatives to choose from. In this paper now, we introduce a generalized version of
impulse balance equilibrium, which can be applied to any normal form game. The predictive
power of generalized impulse balance is then tested against the one of Nash equilibrium in
experimental 3⇥ 3 games, which are based on the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game (Selten, 1991).
In total we gathered data on 26 games, 12 games with completely mixed Nash equilibria and
14 games with partially mixed Nash equilibria. Each game was played over 200 rounds by
12 matching groups of 8 fixed players.
Over all games, impulse balance performs significantly better than Nash equilibrium. In
both types of games – games with completely mixed Nash equilibria and games with partially
mixed Nash equilibria – generalized impulse balance yields predictions that are closer to the
data than the ones of Nash. In fact, generalized impulse balance has in all 26 games a smaller
quadratic distance to the data than Nash. This diﬀerence in predictive power is significant
in 24 out of the 26 games.
In the following we will describe the game structure of the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game, define
the two stationary concepts and apply them to the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game. Thereafter,
experimental design and procedure are presented. In the result section, we compare the
performances of generalized impulse balance and Nash over all games, within the two diﬀerent
type of games and within the two player types. We conclude the paper with a short summary
and discussion.
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2 Game Structure and Stationary Concepts
In this section, we first introduce the structure of the experimentally investigated games,
which are all based on the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game (Selten, 1991). After that, we provide
the conditions for completely and partially mixed Nash equilibria. Subsequently, we define
the generalized impulse balance and apply the concept to the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game.
2.1 The Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game
The Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game (p. 144 in Selten, 1991) is a simple 3 ⇥ 3 games in which
a poacher tries to steal fish from three diﬀerent ponds. A bailiﬀ can secure only one of the
three ponds at a time. If the poacher is caught he gets punished; if the poacher is not caught
he can steel fish from the pond and receives a payoﬀ for it. The ponds have diﬀerent sizes
and therefore, they yield diﬀerent payoﬀs to the poacher if he is not caught. The game is
very similar to Rock, Paper, Scissors with the diﬀerence that it is not a symmetric game.
Poacher
q1 q2 q3
B
ai
liﬀ
p1
+1 0 0
0 V2 V3
p2
0 +1 0
V1 0 V3
p3
0 0 +1
V1 V2 0
Figure 1: The structure of the investigated Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game
Figure 1 gives the payoﬀmatrix of the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game. The bailiﬀ receives a payoﬀ
of 1 if he catches the poacher or a payoﬀ of 0 if he does not. If the poacher is not caught, he
receives Vi which is diﬀerent for each pond i. The payoﬀs Vi are ordered V1 > V2 > V3 > 0
and reflect the diﬀerent pond sizes. If the poacher is caught he receives a payoﬀ of zero.2
2To avoid negative payoﬀs in our experiment, the punishment is set to zero. Instead one could punish the
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2.2 Nash Equilibrium
0
.5
1
y=V3 ⁄ V2
0 .5 1
x=V1 ⁄ (V1+V2)
A
B
Figure 2: Payoﬀ combinations with completely mixed equilibria (A) and partially mixed
equilibria (B). x and y are auxiliary variables with x = V1/(V1 + V2) and y = V2/V2. If the
border of an area is ruled on the outside it does not belong to this area. The border between
A and B belongs not to A, but to B for 12 < x < 1.
In this paper we investigate 3 ⇥ 3 games with unique equilibria that are either completely
mixed
 
p1 > p2 > p3 > 0, and qi = 13 for i = 1, 2, 3
 
or partially mixed
 
p1 > p2 > p3 =
0, qi = 12 for i = 1, 2, and q3 = 0
 
with pi denoting the probabilities of the row player and
qi the ones of the column player. In appendices A.1 and A.2 we show that the games have
exactly one equilibrium for combinations of payoﬀs Vi that fulfill V1 > V2 > V3 > 0. In
appendix A.3 we determine the payoﬀ conditions that either lead to completely or partially
mixed equilibria. The following inequality 1 gives the payoﬀ condition for a completely mixed
poacher, which would yield negative payoﬀs. However, this would not aﬀect the Nash equilibrium as long as
the punishment is the same for all ponds.
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equilibrium and inequality 2 gives the payoﬀ condition for a partially mixed equilibrium.
V3 >
V1V2
V1 + V2
with p1 > p2 > p3 > 0, and qi = 13 for i = 1, 2, 3 (1)
V3  V1V2
V1 + V2
with p1 > p2 > p3 = 0, qi = 12 for i = 1, 2, and q3 = 0 (2)
All combinations of payoﬀs leading to either completely mixed or partially mixed equilibria
are given in figure 2. Set A contains all combinations of V1, V2, V3 with V1 > V2 > V3 > 0
that result in completely mixed equilibria and set B contains all combinations that result
in partially mixed equilibria. All investigated games have combinations of payoﬀs V1, V2, V3
such that they are either part of set A or B. They are given in section 3.1.
Given the payoﬀs the resulting equilibrium probabilities for completely mixed games are
then calculated as
pi = 1 
2
1+Vi
1
1+V1
+ 11+V2 +
1
1+V3
, and qi =
1
3
, for i = 1, 2, 3. (3)
and the ones in the partially mixed games with V1 + V2 + V3 = 15 as3
pi =
Vi
15
, for i = 1, 2, 3, qi =
1
2
for i = 1, 2, and p3 = 0. (4)
2.3 Generalized Impulse Balance
Generalized impulse balance assumes that a player i follows behavioral tendencies reflected
in the probabilities pi1, .., pin for selecting the choices  ⇤i1, ..., ⇤in. These probabilities are not
consciously chosen, but in line with learning direction theory (Selten & Buchta, 1999; Selten,
Abbink, & Cox, 2005), the result of an adjustment process.
3We standardized the payoﬀs with 15 to obtain 14 diﬀerent combinations of V1,V2, and V3 (see appendix
A.5). However, the Nash equilibrium is invariant to the multiplication of all payoﬀs with a constant, and
therefore, other payoﬀs with sums diﬀerent to 15 could be used.
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Consider a situation in which a player i has chosen a pure strategy  i in the preceding period,
but in the present period it turned out that another strategy  ⇤i would have been the better
choice. We call such a situation a foregone payoﬀ situation. A player will be motivated in
such a situation to move towards the superior pure strategy  ⇤i . Thus, in response to the
foregone payoﬀ situation probabilities pi1, .., pin will change. If no more changes of these
probabilities occur impulse balance equilibrium is reached.
Selten & Chmura (2008) defined impulse balance equilibrium (Ockenfels & Selten, 2005)
for completely mixed 2 ⇥ 2 games. Payoﬀs of those completely mixed 2 ⇥ 2 games can be
parameterized as in figure 3. The field D,L player 1 experiences the forgone payoﬀ cL and
in U,R he experiences cR. In U,L player 2 experiences a forgone payoﬀ dU and in D,R he
experiences dD. Therefore, for player 1 foregone payoﬀ situations are on the oﬀ diagonal and
for player 2 on the main diagonal in figure 3. In such forgone payoﬀ situations impulses from
strategy  i to  ⇤i occur. If expected impulses from  i1 to  i2 are equal to expected impulses
from  i2 to  i1 then impulse balance is achieved. In this case a probability vector reflecting
the behavioral tendency of a player will reproduce itself in the long run.
Player 2
L R
P
la
ye
r
1
U
aL + cL aR
bU bU + dU
D
aL aR + cR
bD + dD bD
Figure 3: Structure of 2⇥ 2-Games with mixed equilibria
In Chmura, Goerg, & Selten (2012) we demonstrated that impulse balance leads to impulse
6
proportionality in 2⇥2-games.4 In the following, we will turn our attention to the general case
of the impulse balance and define the equilibrium probabilities via impulse proportionality.
In the general case, impulses are calculated based on the impulse matrix, which is determined
from the payoﬀ matrix. In the following a denotes the payoﬀs from the matrix for the column
player and b the ones of the row player. ↵j is the lowest payoﬀ for the column player in
column j and  i is the lowest payoﬀ for the row player in row i.
a = (↵ij)n⇥m and b = ( ij)n⇥m
↵j = min
i=1,2,3
↵ij and  i = min
j=1,2,3
 ij
The impulse matrixes for column and row players are then given as:
A = (aij) with aij = ↵ij   ↵j
B = (bij) with bij =  ij    i
Let p = (p1, ..., pn) and q = (q1, ..., qm) be the mixed strategies of the two players. In the
following T denotes the transpose operator for matrices, as well as, row and column vectors.
4In Chmura, Goerg, & Selten (2012), we introduced the concept of impulse matching learning.
According to this learning algorithm, players choose actions with probabilities that are determined by the
proportionality of impulses. Let us take a look at the example of the row player. The stationary point of
this process is reached, i.e. the row player does no longer adjust the probabilities, if the ratio of the two
probabilities for U (given as pU ) and D (given as pD) is the same as the ratio of expected impulses for U
and D: pUpD =
qLcL
qRcR
. Impulses to U (given as cL) occur when L is played by the column player (probability
qL); impulses to D (given as cR) occur when R is played (probability qR). The equation can be rewritten
as pDqLcL = pUqRcR, which is the impulse balance equation. In impulse balance equilibrium the impulse
balance equation must be fulfilled. Thus, in 2 ⇥ 2-games impulse balance equilibrium leads to impulse
proportionality.
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Then, the expected impulses I(q) and J(p) of the two players are given as
I(q) =
0BBB@
I1(q)
...
In(q)
1CCCA = AqT and J(p) = ⇣J1(p), ..., Jm(p)⌘ = Bp
In the generalized impulse balance equilibrium, the two players play according to impulse
proportionality, which is given as:
pi =
Ii(q)
I1(q) + ...+ In(q)
for i = 1, ..., n
qj =
Ij(p)
I1(p) + ...+ Im(p)
for i = 1, ...,m
Application to the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game: Recall figure 1 which gives the payoﬀ
matrix of the investigated games. For these games, the payoﬀ matrix and the impulse matrix
are identical. The expected impulses are then given as
I(q) =
0BBB@
q1
q2
q3
1CCCA and J(p) = ⇣(1  p1)V1, (1  p2)V2, (1  p3)V3⌘.
For generalized impulse balance the equilibrium pi = qi for i = 1, 2, 3 and qi is calculated
according to the impulse proportionality:
qj =
(1  pi)Vi
(1  p1)V1 + (1  p2)V2 + (1  p3)V3 for i = 1, 2, 3 (5)
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Uniqueness: In the following we show that the investigated games have unique impulse
matching equilibria. From equation 5 it follows that
pi
1  pi =
Vi
(1  p1)V1 + (1  p2)V2 + (1  p3)V3 for i = 1, 2, 3
We introduce the auxiliary variable Z as Z = (1  p1)V1 + (1  p2)V2 + (1  p3)V3, insert it
into the previous equation, solve it, and simplify for pi.
pi
1  pi =
Vi
Z
pi = (1  pi)Vi
Z
1  pi = 1
1 + ViZ+Vi
pi =
Vi
Z + Vi
Given pi we can rewrite Z as
Z =
V1
1 + V1Z
+
V2
1 + V2Z
+
V3
1 + V3Z
Z = Z
⇣ V1
V1 + Z
+
V2
V2 + Z
+
V3
V3 + Z
⌘
The sum of the probabilities must be p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 and thus the following equation must
be fulfilled:
V1
Z + V1
+
V2
Z + V2
+
V3
Z + V3
= 1 (6)
The left side of equation 6 is equal to three for Z = 0 and it becomes smaller with increasing
9
Z. The limit for Z !1 is zero. Consequently, equation 6 has exactly one solution and this
solution is positive.
3 Experimental Design
We now turn to the experimental design. We first give the parameters of the investigated
games and the resulting Nash equilibria, as well as, generalized impulse balance equilibria.
Afterwards we turn to the procedural details.
1
2
3
4
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16
17
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
0
.5
1
V3 ⁄ V2
0 .5 1
V1 ⁄ (V1+V2)
A
B
Figure 4: Actual payoﬀ combinations for completely mixed equilibria (A) and partially mixed
equilibria (B). Payoﬀ combinations are labeled with game numbers. If the border of an area
is ruled on the outside it does not belong to this area. The border between A and B belongs
not to A, but to B.
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3.1 Experimental Games and Predictions
In total we gathered data on 26 games, 12 games with completely mixed equilibria and 14
games with partially mixed equilibria. The games were selected to cover a broad range of
parameter combinations fulfilling the requirements discussed in section 2.2. Figure 4 gives
the distribution of payoﬀs used for the completely mixed games (A) and partially mixed
games (B).
Table 1 gives the actual payoﬀs for each game, as well as, the resulting probabilities of Nash
equilibrium and generalized impulse balance. Games 1 to 12 are with completely mixed
equilibria and games 13-26 are with partially mixed equilibria. We tried to find combinations
(V1, V2, V3) that were integer numbers or with .5 after the decimal point. Sections A.4 and
A.5 in the Appendix give more details on the selection of payoﬀs (V1, V2, V3).
3.2 Procedures
The experiments were conducted in 2007 at the Smith Experimental Economics Research
Center of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were students recruited via online announcements. In total
1,246 students participated.
The experiments were conducted by local research assistants. Upon arrival, subjects were
seated in cubicles, the printed instructions were distributed, and read to the subjects.5 After
all remaining questions were answered the experiment started. During each session two
games were played, each of the games was played for 200 rounds. Subjects were assigned
to matching groups of 8 players, 4 subjects in the role of column players and 4 subjects in
the role of row players. The roles and the matching groups were fixed for the course of the
whole experiment. Subjects knew that their roles were fixed, but did not know the size of
5An English translation of the instructions is available in Appendix B.
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the matching groups and they were not informed about the second game to come.
Games 1-13 Games 14-26
1. Game #Obs. 2. Game #Obs. # Subjects 1. Game #Obs. 2. Game #Obs. # Subjects
1 6 14 6 48 14 6 1 6 48
2 6 15 6 48 15 6 2 6 48
3 6 16 6 48 16 6 3 6 48
4 6 17 6 48 17 6 4 6 48
5 6 18 6 48 18 6 5 6 48
6 6 19 6 48 19 6 6 6 48
7 6 20 6 48 20 6 7 6 48
8 6 21 6 48 21 6 8 6 48
9 6 22 6 48 22 6 9 6 48
10 6 23 6 48 23 6 10 6 48
11 6 24 6 48 24 6 11 6 48
12 6 25 6 48 25 6 12 6 48
13 6 26 6 48 26 6 13 6 48
Table 2: Order of played games, number of gathered observations, and number of subjects
For each of the 26 games we gathered 12 observations. The first 6 observations are completely
independent as they were gathered as first games played in each session. The additional 6
observations per game were gathered with the second games in the sessions. In total we
gathered 156 completely independent observations, i.e., the games that were played first,
and additional 156 observations resulting from the games that were played second in each
session. Table 2 gives an overview of the order in which the games were played and the
number of collected observations.
4 Results
In the following we will compare the predictive success of Nash equilibrium and generalized
impulse balance equilibrium. Our measure of predictive success is the mean quadratic
distance of the corresponding concept to the data. The predictive success of a stationary
concept increases with a decreasing mean quadratic distance, i.e., the smaller the mean
quadratic distance, the closer the predictions to the experimental data. The mean quadratic
13
distance Q is the average quadratic distance over all 26 games and over all 12 matching
groups per game. It is defined as
Q =
1
26
26X
g=1
 
1
12
12X
n=1
✓ 3X
i=1
(qi,g   fPoacheri,g,n )2 +
3X
i=1
(pi,g   fBailiﬀi,g,n )2
◆!
,
with fi,g,n being the observed mean frequencies for strategy i in game g and matching group
n of the poacher or the bailiﬀ. The probabilities for the poacher and bailiﬀ for strategy i in
game g are given as qi,g and pi,g, respectively.
4.1 Overall Comparison
Figure 5 gives the mean quadratic distances of Nash equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium
in the completely and partially mixed games. Table 3 gives the mean quadratic distances
for each game, overall games, for the completely mixed and for the partially mixed games.
In addition, p-values of the two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates
are given.6
The quadratic distance of Nash to the data is over all games 2.2 times larger then the one
of impulse balance; 1.8 times larger in the completely mixed games and 2.6 times larger in
the partially mixed games. Thus, impulse balance performs significantly better then Nash
equilibrium over all games and, in addition, in the subsets of completely and partially mixed
games (all comparisons with p < 0.01, two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test). In fact,
6All tests within one game are based on all 12 observations, the tests over diﬀerent games are only based
on the first 6 observations. We did this to prevent testing two observations from the same matching group
as independent observations. However, the order of games does not influence the behavior: comparing the
mean quadratic distance to Nash in the 156 games played first with the one from the 156 played second
yields no significant diﬀerences (p = 0.868, two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test). The same holds true
if we compare the quadratic distance of generalized impulse balance (p = 0.943).
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Figure 5: Mean quadratic distances of generalized impulse balance and Nash equilibrium in
completely and partially mixed games
impulse balance equilibrium has in all 26 games a smaller quadratic distance to the data
than the Nash equilibrium. The respective diﬀerence is for all but two games (5 and 19)
significantly smaller for impulse balance.
4.2 Comparison by Player Type
In the previous section we have tested the mean quadratic distances over both player types.
We now analyze the behavior of row and column players separately.
The mean quadratic distance of column players’ behavior to the predictions of Nash equilibrium
is 1.9 times larger than to the predictions of impulse balance; the one of the row players even
2.5 times. Thus, impulse balance yields for both player types predictions that are significantly
more accurate then the ones of Nash (both p < 0.01, two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation
test).
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Mean Quadratic Distance
Game Nash equilibrium Impulse balance Test result
C
om
pl
et
el
y
M
ix
ed
G
am
es
1 .0081996 .0012142 p < 0.01
2 .046566 .0161672 p < 0.01
3 .3925316 .3370174 p = .024
4 .3533856 .3157302 p = .069
5 .438024 .4311328 p = .693
6 .1479702 .0436702 p < 0.01
7 .0889139 .0036896 p < 0.01
8 .1067579 .0035281 p < 0.01
9 .2257292 .1066953 p < 0.01
10 .2447339 .1094036 p < 0.01
11 .1773554 .0063303 p < 0.01
12 .2358219 .0106885 p < 0.01
Pa
rt
ia
lly
M
ix
ed
G
am
es
13 .4418155 .093474 p < 0.01
14 .102257 .0035309 p < 0.01
15 .0538412 .0057088 p < 0.01
16 .1594839 .0023688 p < 0.01
17 .5023688 .1825391 p < 0.01
18 .5692925 .33373 p < 0.01
19 .2267045 .1659287 p = .148
20 .1364765 .0043931 p < 0.01
21 .6072232 .3554866 p < 0.01
22 .6190886 .2515403 p < 0.01
23 .1364617 .0119635 p < 0.01
24 .2552776 .0126557 p < 0.01
25 .7569099 .4457908 p < 0.01
26 .2805532 .0257224 p < 0.01
Overall .2812978 .1261577 p < 0.01
1-12 .2054991 .1154389 p < 0.01
13-26 .3462682 .1353452 p < 0.01
Table 3: Mean quadratic distances for Nash equilibrium and generalized impulse balance.
The p-Values are for the two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test with paired replicates,
test within games are based on all 12 observations, tests over diﬀerent games are based on
the first 6 independent observations
Figure 6 gives the mean quadratic distances of the two stationary concepts to each player
type in completely and partially mixed games. The figure reveals that the better performance
of impulse balance for column players is driven by the bad performance of Nash in partially
mixed games. There, Nash has a significantly larger distance to the behavior of column
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Figure 6: Mean quadratic distances of impulse balance equilibrium and Nash equilibrium in
completely and partially mixed games for the two player types
players than impulse balance (p < 0.01, two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test); while in
completely mixed games the diﬀerence is not significant (p = 0.25, two-sided Fisher-Pitman
permutation test). For row players the picture looks a little bit diﬀerent. There, impulse
balance dominates Nash in completely, as well as, partially mixed games (both p < 0.01,
two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test).
5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we derived a generalized version of impulse balance equilibrium, which is a
non-parametric stationary concept based on the idea of learning direction theory (Selten &
Buchta, 1999). The predictions of generalized impulse balance were tested against the ones
of Nash in 26 experimental 3⇥ 3 games, all based on the Bailiﬀ and Poacher Game (Selten,
1991).
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Over all games generalized impulse balance performed significantly better than Nash equilibrium:
the quadratic distance of the Nash equilibrium to the data was 2.2 times larger then the one
of impulse balance. Generalized impulse balance did not only perform better over all games,
but in each single game of the 26 games played. In all but two games this smaller distance
to the data was statistically significant with a two-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test.
Our 3 ⇥ 3 data, together with the evidence gathered in 2 ⇥ 2-games (Avrahami, Güth, &
Kareev, 2005, Selten & Chmura, 2008), 2⇥ 2⇥ 2-games (Avrahami, Güth, & Kareev, 2005),
as well as, cyclic games (Goerg & Selten, 2009), suggests that impulse balance is very good
predictor for human behavior in games with mixed Nash equilibria. In all of these studies
impulse balance outperformed the mixed predictions of Nash equilibrium.
With quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) there already exists a well
established concept, which usually fits empirical data better than Nash does. However, it has
one free parameter to be estimated from the data, while impulse balance is parameter free.
We, therefore, believe that impulse balance is a powerful alternative to Nash equilibrium for
games with mixed strategies.
18
References
Avrahami, J., W. Güth & YKareev (2005) “Games of Competition in a Stochastic Environment.”
Theory and Decision, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 255–94.
Brunner, C., C.F. Camerer & J.K. Goeree (2011) “Stationary Concepts for Experimental
2⇥ 2 Games: Comment.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, pp. 1029–1040.
Chmura, T., S.J. Goerg & R. Selten (2012) “Learning in Experimental 2⇥ 2 Games.” Games
and Economic Behavior, Vol. 76, No. 1 (September 2012): 44–73.
Crawford, V.P. &M.A. Costa-Gomes (2006) “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing
Games: An Experimental Study”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 5, pp. 1737–1768.
Erev, I. & A.E. Roth (1998) “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in
Experimental Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria.” The American Economic Review,
Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 848–81.
Fischbacher, U. (2007) “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.” Experimental
Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 171–178.
Goerg, S.J. & R. Selten (2009) “Experimental Investigation of Stationary Concepts in Cyclic
Duopoly Games.” Experimental Economics, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 253–271.
Ho, T.H., Camerer, C. & Chong, J.K. (2007) “Self-tuning experience-weighted attraction
learning in games.” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 133, 177–198.
Ho, T-H., Camerer, C. & Weigelt, K. (1998) “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response
in Experimental P-Beauty Contests”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, 947–969.
McKelvey, R.D. & T. R. Palfrey (1995) “Quantal response equilibria for normal form games.”
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 6–38.
McKelvey, R. & T. Palfrey (1998) “Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games”,
Experimental Economics, Vol. 1, pp. 9–41.
19
Nagel, R. (1995) “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study”, The American
Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 5, pp. 1313–1326.
Ockenfels, A. & R. Selten (2005) “Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price
Auctions.” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 51, pp. 155–170.
Osborne, M.J. & A. Rubinstein (1998) “Games with procedurally rational players.” The
American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 834–847.
Roth, A.E. & I Erev (1995) “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple
Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 8, pp. 164–212.
Selten, R. (1991) Game Equilibrium Models I: Evolution and Game Dynamics, Springer Berlin
Heidelberg 1st ed. 1991
Selten, R. & J. Buchta (1999) “Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed
bid functions.” In D. Budescu, I. Erev, & R. Zwick (Eds.), Games and human behavior: essays in
the honor of Amnon Rapoport. Hillsade: Erlbaum.
Selten, R., K. Abbink & R. Cox (2005) “Learning direction theory and the winner’s curse.”
Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 5–20.
Selten, R. & T. Chmura (2008) “Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 ⇥ 2-Games.” The
American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 938–966.
Selten, R., T. Chmura & S.J. Goerg (2011) “Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 ⇥
2-Games: Reply.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, pp. 1041–1044.
20
A Equilibria and Payoﬀs
The games in our experiment have the following structure, with Vi > Vj > Vk > 0
Poacher
i j k
B
ai
liﬀ
i +1 0 00 Vj Vk
j 0 +1 0
Vi 0 Vk
k 0 0 +1
Vi Vj 0
Figure 7: The structure of the investigated 3⇥ 3 games
In the following sections, we first show the uniqueness of completely and partially mixed equilibria
for the investigated games. Thereafter, we will determine the conditions that lead to completely
mixed and partially mixed equilibria and, finally, we will show how we selected the payoﬀs of the
26 games investigated in this paper.
A.1 Uniqueness of the completely mixed equilibrium
The equilibrium probabilities for the bailiﬀ are given as:
pi = 1 
2
1+Vi
1
1+V1
+ 11+V2 +
1
1+V3
,
while the poacher plays with
qi =
1
3
, for i = 1, 2, 3.
The expected payoﬀ of the bailiﬀ is:
EBailiﬀ =
1
3
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The expected payoﬀ of the poacher is:
EPoacher =
1
3
[p1(V2 + V3) + p2(V1 + V3) + p3(V1 + V2)]
=
1
3
[(1  p1)V1 + (1  p2)V2 + (1  p3)V3]
=
V
1
1 p1 +
1
1 p2 +
1
1 p3
with V = V1 + V2 + V3.
Proposition 1. If p = (p1, p2, p3) with p1 > p3 > p3 > 0 and p1 + p3 + p3 = 1 is an equilibrium of
the game, the game has no additional equilibria.
Proof:
1. The game has no pure strategy equilibrium. This is straight forward given the game structure
in figure 7.
2. It remains to be shown that no equilibrium exists for which the pure strategy k has the
probability pk = 0 and the two remaining strategies i and j have positive probabilities pi and
pj .
We consider the following part of the original game:
i j
i +1 00 Vj
j 0 +1
Vi 0
If player D does not use strategy k it cannot be part of W’s equilibrium strategy. Thus, an
equilibrium with pk = 0 must be an equilibrium of the above 2 ⇥ 2 game. The equilibrium
probabilities of this game are given as:
qi = qj =
1
2
, pi =
Vi
Vi + Vj
, and pj =
Vj
Vi + Vj
.
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Without loss of generality we assume that Vi > Vj , which implies 1/Vj > 1/Vi and thus pi > pj .
Then, the resulting equilibrium payoﬀs in the 2⇥ 2 game are
EBailiﬀ =
1
2
, and EPoacher =
1
1
Vi
+ 1Vj
.
The equilibrium of the 2⇥ 2 game is an equilibrium point of the investigated 3⇥ 3 game if
1
1
Vi
+ 1Vj
  Vk
holds. Otherwise, Vk would be the only best response of D. Thus, the investigated 3⇥3 games have
a completely mixed equilibrium with pk > 0, if
1
1
Vi
+ 1Vj
< Vk.
This corresponds to
1
Vk
<
1
Vi
+
1
Vj
.
The left side reaches its maximum for i = 1 and j = 2 and the inequality holds for all triple with
1
V3
<
1
V1
+
1
V2
.
Assume that p = (p1, p2, p3) with p1 > p3 > p3 > 0 and p1 + p3 + p3 = 1 is a completely mixed
equilibrium of the game. From the inverse formula it follows that the last inequality is equivalent
to :
1  p3 < 1  p1 + 1  p2 , 0 < 1  p1   p2 + p3 ) 0 < 2p3
Which is always true. Thus, we conclude our first result:
Result 1. Our 3 ⇥ 3 game has exactly one completely mixed equilibrium p = (p1, p2, p3) with
p1 > p3 > p3 > 0 if conditions 1V3 <
1
V1
+ 1V2 and V1 > V2 > V3 > 0 are fulfilled. If this is the case
no other equilibrium than the completely mixed one exists.
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A.2 Uniqueness of the partially mixed equilibrium
The game has a partially mixed equilibrium (p1, p2, p3) with p1 > 0, p2 > 0 and pk = 0 if
Vk  11
Vi
+ 1Vj
.
This is the case iﬀ
1
Vk
  1
Vi
+
1
Vj
is true. If such an equilibrium for k = 1, 2, 3 exists adding the corresponding inequalities yields
1
V1
+
1
V2
+
1
V3
  2[ 1
V1
+
1
V2
+
1
V3
],
which is obviously not true. Can two of those equilibria exist? If so, one of the equilibria must be
with p3 = 0. Therefore, it follows that:
1
V3
  1
V1
+
1
V2
.
If the game has in addition a partially mixed equilibrium with p2 = 0 it follows that:
1
V2
  1
V1
+
1
V3
.
Substituting V3 in the previous inequality leads to
1
V2
  1
V1
+
1
V1
+
1
V2
.
Which corresponds to
0   2
V1
.
Therefore, there exists no partially mixed equilibrium with p2 = 0. Analogously, one can show that
the same must hold for p1 = 0. Thus, in a partially mixed equilibrium (p1, p2, p3) it is necessary
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that p3 = 0. Since the game must have at least one equilibrium we have the following result.
Result 2. If the game does not have a completely mixed equilibrium it follows that the equilibrium of
the part game with strategies 1 and 2 is also the equilibrium of the whole game. No further equilibria
exist for the whole 3⇥ 3 game.
A.3 Payoﬀ conditions for the diﬀerent types of Equilibria
From results 1 and 2 it follows that for V1 > V2 > V3 > 0 the following result must be true:
Result 3. The game has exactly one equilibrium. For
V3 >
V1V2
V1 + V2
it is the completely mixed equilibrium (p, q) with p1 > p2 > p3 > 0 and qi = 13 with i = 1, 2, 3. For
V3  V1V2
V1 + V2
it is the partially mixed equilibrium (p, q) with p3 = q3 = 0, p1 > p2 > 0 and qi = 12 with i = 1, 2.
We will now investigate the implications of result 3 for the parameter triple (V1, V2, V3). Therefore,
we introduce the auxiliary variables x and y:
x =
V1
V1 + V2
and y =
V3
V2
The inequality V3 > V1V2V1+V2 can be rewritten as
V3
V2
> V1V1+V2 , which means that
y > x.
Because of V1 > V2 we know that x > 12 and because of V3 < V2 we know that y < 1. Therefore,
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the equilibrium is completely mixed iﬀ the inequality
1
2
< x < y < 1 (7)
holds. Likewise, the equilibrium is partially mixed iﬀ the inequality
1
2
< x  y < 1 (8)
holds. We now determine for each given pair (x, y) with 12 < x < 1 and
1
2 < y < 1 and a given
V = V1 + V2 + V3 the corresponding parameters V1, V2, and V3.
The parameters Vi as functions of x, y, and V
From x(V1 + V2) = V1 it follows that V1 = 11 xV2. In addition, V3 = yV holds. Thus,
V = (
1
1  x + 1 + y)V2.
The inverse of the coeﬃcient of V2 can be simplified as:
1
1
1 x + 1 + y
=
1  x
2  x+ y(1  x)
We now introduce a always positive auxiliary variable
z = 2  x+ y(1  x)
and get
V1 =
V
z
, V2 = (1  x)V
z
, and V3 = y(1  x)V
z
.
From this, one can see that V1 > V2 > V3 > 0 as well as x = V1V1+V2 and y =
V3
V2
hold for the values
of Vi.
26
0
.5
1
y=V3 ⁄ V2
0 .5 1
x=V1 ⁄ (V1+V2)
A
B
Figure 8: Payoﬀ combinations with completely mixed equilibria (A) and partially mixed
equilibria (B). x and y are auxiliary variables with x = V1/(V1 + V2) and y = V2/V2. If the
border of an area is ruled on the outside it does not belong to this area. The border between
A and B belongs not to A, but to B for 12 < x < 1.
Figure 8 gives the combination of parameters that lead to completely and partially mixed equilibria.
If the border of an area is ruled on the outside it does not belong to this area. The border between
A and B belongs not to A, but to B for 12 < x < 1.
For a given V it holds that V1 = Vz , V2 = (1   x)Vz and V3 = y(1   x)Vz with z=2-x+y(1-x). The
set A [ B contains all (x, y) which results in the triples (V1, V2, V3) with V1 > V2 > V3 > 0. Points
(x, y) in A lead to triples (V1, V2, V3) with completely mixed equilibria (p1 > p2 > p3 > 0) and
points (x, y) in B lead to triples (V1, V2, V3) with partially mixed equilibria (p1 > p2 > p3 = 0).
A.4 Payoﬀs for the completely mixed games
In our experiments, we want to investigate 12 games with completely mixed equilibria. We search
for twelve parameter combinations that are relatively uniformly distributed in the space (p1, p2, p3)
with p1 > p2 > p3 > 0 and p1 + p3 + p3 = 1. Therefore, we consider all games with equilibria
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Game k1 k2 k3 m1 m2 m3 P M1 M2 M3 V1 V2 V3
1 6 5 4 9 10 11 990 110 99 90 55 49.5 45
2 7 5 3 8 10 12 960 120 96 80 60 48 40
3 7 6 2 8 9 13 936 117 104 72 58.5 52 36
4 8 4 3 7 11 12 924 132 84 77 66 42 38.5
5 8 5 2 7 10 13 910 130 91 70 65 45.5 35
6 8 6 1 7 9 14 882 126 98 63 63 49 31.5
7 9 4 2 7 11 13 858 143 78 66 71.5 39 33
8 9 5 1 6 10 14 840 140 84 60 70 42 30
9 10 3 2 5 12 13 780 156 65 60 78 32.5 30
10 10 4 1 5 11 14 770 154 70 55 77 35 27.5
11 11 3 1 4 12 14 672 168 56 48 84 28 24
12 12 2 1 3 13 14 546 182 42 39 91 21 19.5
Table 4: Parameters and payoﬀs for the completely mixed games
p = (p1, p2, p3) for which
pi =
k1
15
for i=1,2,3
with k1 > k2 > k3 and k1 + k2 + k3 = 15 apply. The payoﬀs are calculated with the help of
the inverse formula with a preference for small integer numbers. We now introduce the following
notations:
mi = 15  ki, for i = 1, 2, 3
P = m1m2m3
Mi =
P
mi
.
It follows from the inverse formula that
V1 : V2 : V3 =
1
1  p1 :
1
1  p2 :
1
1  p3
and therefore it holds that
V1 : V2 : V3 =
15
m1
:
15
m2
:
15
m3
=
1
m1
:
1
m2
:
1
m3
.
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Multiplying the right side with P yields
V1 : V2 : V3 = M1 : M2 : M3
Table 4 give the 12 combinations of ki, mi, P , and Mi investigated in our experiment. Vi can be
fixed as Vi = Mi for i = 1, 2, 3. If M1, M2, and M3 have a common divisor K one can instead fix
Vi as Vi = MiK .
A.5 Payoﬀs for the partially mixed games
In our experiments, we want to investigate 14 games with partially mixed equilibria. We search for
fourteen parameter combinations that are relatively uniformly distributed in the space (p1, p2, p3)
with p1 > p3 > p3 = 0 and p1 + p3 + p3 = 1.
Game V1 V2 V3
13 8 7 3
14 8 7 2
15 8 7 1
16 9 6 3
17 9 6 2
18 9 6 1
19 10 5 3
20 10 5 2
21 10 5 1
22 11 4 2
23 11 4 1
24 12 3 2
25 12 3 1
26 13 2 1
Table 5: Payoﬀs for the partially mixed games
Let p = (p1, p2, p3) be a strategy of D with p1+p2 = 1 and p3 = 0. If p is together with q = (12 ,
1
2 , 0)
an equilibrium of a game with positive payoﬀs V1, V2, V3 and V1 > V2 > V3 > 0 then the following
holds:
p1 =
V1
V1 + V2
, p2 =
V2
V1 + V2
, and V3  V1V2
V1 + V2
.
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Thus,
V1 = p1(V1 + V2), V2 = p2(V1 + V2), and V3 = p1p2(V1 + V2)
For every fixed V = V1+V2+V3 and every partially mixed equilibrium p = (p1, p2, 0) has the game
with the parameters V1, V2, and V3 exactly this equilibrium if
V1 = p1(V1 + V2), V2 = p2(V1 + V2), and 0 < V3 = p1p2(V1 + V2)
holds. This condition describes the combination of parameters (V1, V2, V3) with V1 > V2 > V3 > 0
that belong to games with equilibria (p1, p2, 0). In equilibrium, the probability pi is given as
pi =
ki
15
, with Vi = ki for i = 1, 2.
Table 5 gives all combinations (V1, V2, V3) with V1 > V2 > V3 > 0 for which p3 = 0 and integer ki
and V3.
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B Instructions
Welcome to this experiment!
General information
This experiment gives you the opportunity to earn money with your decisions. The size of your
earnings depends on your own decisions and on the decisions of the other participants of the
experiment. You will receive a show-up fee irrespective of the result of the experiment. Please
read the explanations of the experiment carefully. All participants receive identical explanations.
We would like to ask you not to communicate with the other participants from now on. If you have
any questions, please feel free to ask us. All decisions are taken anonymously. You will shortly draw
a random number. This number corresponds to the number of the booth in the laboratory.
The course of the experiment
24 people in this room will participate at this experiment. The duration of this experiment will be
200 periods. Please take a look at the figures on page 2. A similar table will be shown to you during
the experiment. You will be either a row player or a column player. In each round of the experiment
you will be asked to choose a row or a column, respectively. The player type will be assigned to
you randomly. You will be this player type till the end of the experiment. In each round, you will
be matched to a diﬀerent player of the other type. Neither you will know who the other player is
nor if you have been playing with him before.
The numbers shown in the table indicate the points you can earn during the experiment. The
points shown in the upper left corner of each cell are the payoﬀs for the row player; the points in
the lower right corner are the payoﬀs for the column player. To avoid confusion, in the experiment
your payoﬀs will be written in blue while the other player’s payoﬀs will be shown in red. To choose
a row or a column, you just have to press the according button.
After both players have taken their decision, the resulting cell and your payoﬀ will be shown to you.
This procedure will be repeated for 200 periods. From round 2 on, you can see the sum of points
you earned so far in a box on your screen.
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End of the Experiment and Payments
At the end of the experiment, you will be told your Final payoﬀ, i.e. the sum of the payoﬀs of each
round. Afterwards, a short questionnaire will appear on your screen. Please answer the questions
as carefully as possible. The points will be transferred to RMB by a fixed exchange rate.
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